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THE THREE VOICES OF LIBEL
RANDAiL BEZANSON*
BRLAN C. MURCIUSON**

The libel tort has been a focus of attention since the 1964 Supreme
Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' True to its character
as a tort that has taken many forms and served changing public and private
purposes throughout its long history, libel has fully occupied scholars for
the past twenty-five years. The multiple dimensions of the tort-technical,
procedural, substantive, sociological, and jurisprudential-have been assessed from nearly every vantage point.2 While those who have studied the
libel tort know its considerable depths, recent scholarship and judicial
attention have begun to coalesce around three basic forms, or strata, of the
tort. These three forms are the basic common-law tort, the modern constitutionalized tort, and the even more recent modification in the form of an
3
action for declaratory judgment.
The three basic actions in libel will be our focus. Our purpose is to
outline the fundamental elements of each form, and to suggest relevant
substantive, sociological, and jurisprudential differences in an effort to place

* Dean, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
** B.A. 1974, J.D. 1979, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Washington and
Lee University School of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. The diversity of the literature is rich. For a wide-ranging collection of essays on
topics such as the sociological underpinnings of the tort, legislative reform efforts, the role of
the jury, and empirical findings, see Symposium: New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation,
74 CAIuF. L. REv. 677 (1986). For additional views through the lenses of journalists, practitioners, communication theorists, and several prominent libel plaintiffs, see Symposium: Libel,
90 DICK. L. REv. 539 (1986); Symposium: Libel, 38 MERCER L. REv. 753 (1987). See also
Matheson, Procedurein Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the FirstAmendment,
66 TEx. L. REv. 215 (1987) (procedural vantage point); Tiersma, The Language of Defamation,
66 TEx. L. REv. 303 (1987) (speech theory).
3. See, e.g., Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 Wm. AND MARY L.
REv. 747 (1984) (tracing evolving purposes of libel tort, and calling for reform of modern tort
by instituting "actual injury" rule); Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current
Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1986) (proposing reform legislation giving libel plaintiffs
choice of bringing declaratory judgment action on issue of truth or falsity, with no damages
available); Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgmentsfor Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALI. L. Rv.
847 (1986) (outlining declaratory judgment approach introduced as "study bill" by Congressman
Charles Schumer in 1985); Proposalfor the Reform of Libel Law, Report of the Libel Reform
Project of the Annenberg Washington Program(1988) [hereinafter Annenberg Report] (reform
proposal that mandates pre-suit request for reply or retraction; provides for declaratory relief
alternative; permits defendants to transform action for damages to action for declaratory
judgment); Cook, Reconciling the First Amendment with the Individual's Reputation: The
DeclaratoryJudgment as an Option for Libel Suits, 93 DICK. L. Rav. 265 (1989) (reviewing
purposes of this alternative).
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each tort in comparative perspective. At the most general level, we will
conclude that each tort is radically distinctive in the social and jurisprudential
purposes it serves. The common-law tort serves the individual's ability to
function in organized society through protection against reputational injury
in the community context. The constitutional tort serves collective or public
ends of self-government, reflecting and to some extent responding to our
society's mendacity. The declaratory judgment tort serves the private and
public interest in accuracy of information, and thereby exacts accountability
from the media for the truth of publications.
The three torts and the three very different "voices" they project are
remarkably diverse. They present the three choices that lie before us as the
most recent era of attention paid the libel tort winds toward its conclusion.
I.
Before exploring the social and jurisprudential differences among the
three torts, the essential elements of each can be summarized. Our discussion
will be necessarily brief, and will focus on the basic aspects of each tort
particularly as they bear on our comparative analysis.
The common-law tort has witnessed great evolutionary change over its
extended life. 4 From the beginning it has been a subtle, complex, and often
byzantine collection of rules and presumptions. At the risk of some over
generalization, however, its basic character can be distilled. The commonlaw tort protects the individual's interest in reputation in a community;
indeed, the tort's elements relate closely to its concept of reputation. The
essence of reputation at common law is membership in a structure-the
condition of sameness, of nonalienation from the community, of belonging
to an established order in which one might prosper. In the eyes of the
common law, the individual's interest is freedom from reputational injury
that would interfere with achievement or retention of a desired role in the
community, and the security-of whatever kind-that such a community
role makes possible. Accordingly, loss of reputation in the community
through a disparaging statement about the individual is compensated by
money damages.
At common law the falsity of an offending statement is effectively
presumed for all practical purposes, and the measure of damages is left to
the broad discretion of the jury. While the common-law tort requires proof
of reputational harm based on the perception of the injured party by others,

4. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 771-73 (5th ed. 1984); Donnelly, History
of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99; Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of
Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. R.v. 789 (1964); Anderson,
supra note 3; Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation 1, 3 CoLuM. L.
REv. 546 (1903); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation 1, 43 CoLUM.
L. Riv. 33 (1904); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS (P.L.I. 1980); R. SMOLLA,
Sunr, TE PREss (1986). See Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 535
(1988) (noting changes in approach to reputation, compensation, publication and privilege).
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this proof requirement is not often a major hurdle given the rules and
presumptions that surround the issue. Indeed, the tort is very much geared
toward the harmed individual, based as it is on the principal goal of
protecting the individual's interest in his or her position in a community or
in not being excluded from a community.s
In contrast, the constitutional libel tort focuses its protection on the
publisher of information, thus reflecting in part a different concept of
reputation. By 1964 the concept of "reputation" seems to have altered,
resulting in a transformed tort. The old valued condition of sameness, of
membership in an established order, became suspect in the libel context,
particularly where public officials stood as plaintiffs. 6 "Reputation" acquired the connotation of "status quo" in a time of social ferment, and
while its new connotation was never made explicit, the reputational interest
had clearly suffered. What emerged was a "constitutionalized" libel tort
protecting the publisher of accusatory (and often erroneous) information
about the political-social status quo, rather than the public official, whose
invocations of "reputation" seemed almost of another time and idiom.
Accordingly, the constitutional tort requires proof of both the factual
falsity of an offending statement and its faulty publication. At least for
most media publishers, fault generally requires conscious falsehood. In some
cases negligence will suffice. Comparatively, reputational harm is not prominent. It is often-and safely-presumed. The focus on fault makes reputational harm seem less pressing as the focus of inquiry both related to
falsity and to fault is text-based, and therefore, the community-based interest
in reputational harm is hardly relevant, for what other people perceived is
not really the issue. While harm must be proven, the rules are liberal and
proof most often comes from the injured party. In any event, limitations
that may stem from requirements that harm be proven are rarely relevant,
because the constitutional requirements of proof of falsity and fault are so
overwhelming that few cases survive them.
The declaratory judgment action represents an effort to strip the fault
privileges away from the constitutional tort but retain the principal focus
on factual falsity. 7 The declaratory judgment action, therefore, is based on
5. The relevant community is a highly flexible concept, reflecting not only the scope
and nature of a plaintiff's social, family, and professional relationships, but also reflecting
the nature of the offending statement and the persons likely to be influenced by it. See W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 786-95, 842-43 (5th ed. 1984); Anderson, supra note
3. For a discussion of the types of plaintiffs who sue, the kinds of statements giving rise to
suit, and the relevant "community" context in which harm was alleged, see R. BEZANsON, G.
CRANBERO, & J. SoLosKi,

LMEL LAW AND THE Pmss. MYTH AND REALY 6-15, 19-25, 92-93,

152-62 (1987) [hereinafter LMEL LAW AND THE PRass].
6. Justice Black observed that "instead of being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's
political, social and financial prestige [was] likely ... enhanced by the Times' publication."
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (Black, J., concurring). This comment
suggested not simply that Sullivan's libel case was something of a sham but more generally
that the interest in "reputation" as then understood was a concept whose persuasive power
was at a low ebb.
7. See generally Franklin, supra note 3.
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the twin assumptions that fault requirements are too onerous and are often
counterproductive, but that the community-based reputational interest of
the common-law tort is anachronistic. "Reputation" is replaced by an
interest in factual accuracy of publication-an interest not in sustaining ties
to a community but in controlling the content of information in a society
where "facts" are accumulated and dispersed on a vast scale often in
permanent form for multiple purposes. In service of these principles the
declaratory judgment action, which has many variants that will not be
explored here, 8 requires a party who is the subject of a damaging statement
to prove falsity. Proof of reputational harm is usually required, but the
requirement tends to be nominal only as community-based perception, which
is not governed by falsity, is not really relevant. Instead, harm exists de
facto from the fact of having been the subject of a factually inaccurate
statement about which the subject feels strongly enough to sue. As a quid
pro quo for eliminating the requirement of proving fault, money damages
are abolished, leaving a judgment or in some cases a required correction as
the injured party's remedy. Some declaratory judgment proposals permit
recovery of attorney fees. The declaratory judgment action offers something
for both the plaintiffs (no fault) and the defendants (no money damages,
less intrusive discovery). Its principal object, however, seems to be neither
vindication of the individual's reputation in the community nor protection
of the publisher from liability; instead, the principal object is vindication
of truth as a matter of historical record.
II.
Perhaps the basic difference among the three torts, and the one most
laden with implication, concerns their underlying assumptions about the
communicative process itself. First, each tort reflects a different set of
assumptions about how communication works, and thus about the connection between accusatory communication and harm. Second, each tort differs
in evaluating the social function of communication, and hence in calibrating
the amount of legal control that the tort will provide.
We turn first to the torts' assumptions about the way in which communication operates. The common-law libel tort was based on an understanding of communication as an interactive process between communicator
and recipients, a process marked by multiple interpretations as a message
filters through different perceptions people bring to information and dif-

8. The Schumer and Annenberg proposals allow a media defendant unilaterally to
transform a plaintiff's action for damages into an action for declaratory judgment. See Barrett,
supra note 3, at 864-76; Annenberg Report, supra note 3, at § 4(e). The Franklin proposal
does not give media defendants such an option. See Franklin, supra note 3, at 836-42. Another
variation of the declaratory judgment mode is the voluntary, out-of-court process devised by
the Libel Dispute Resolution Program and the American Arbitration Association, in which a
neutral third party makes a determination as to the truth or falsity of the statements in
question. See Wissler, Bezanson, Cranberg, Soloski, An Alternative to the Problems of Libel
Litigation, in 1988 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 99, 105-10 (1988).
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fering social frameworks in which information takes on significance. 9
For all this complexity, the common law was pragmatic as well. It did
not become paralyzed by the multiplicity of attributed meanings. Instead,
it assumed that in a communication's passage through a community, various
interpretations would be verbalized, reworded, embellished, or stripped
down, and finally would coalesce into a core message consistent with local
idiom, prejudice, and values. This core message could fairly be judged the
"audience interpretation." "Communication," then, was a phenomenon
capable of provoking a virtually automatic chain of response and translation
with meaning highly dependent on a common interpretive process.
In view of this dynamic interaction, it was a short step to assume that
if the core meaning was accusatory, harm was likely-particularly as the
collective interpretation was hardening within the community. Thus, a fairly
direct cause-and-effect relationship was perceived between an accusatory
interpretation and relational harm suffered by the subject. 0 The process of
interpretation itself contributed in no small part to the relational damage.
Still, the common law did not insist on proving a cause-and-effect
relationship in all cases. The presumption of damages reflected additional
understandings of the communicative process. First, the presumption acknowledged that a communication, as interpreted, could cause far more
subtle forms of loss than financial impact." The presumption also reflected
a notion that harm would be virtually inevitable in the community's very
process of interpreting certain communications. Having interpreted a statement as accusatory, a person-and by extension, a community-would find
it impossible to dislodge the accusatory meaning from consciousness; the
apparent permanence of an accusation in the interpreting mind itself would
constitute harm to the subject.
The common law, then, displayed a fairly sensitive grasp of the communicative process by centering on the role of community interpretation
and the range of communicative damage, both tangible and intangible.
The constitutional tort, in marked contrast, radically diminishes the
common-law tort's case-by-case focus on community interpretation and
instead focuses almost wholly on the speaker's intention, as limited by the
text or literal words used. In a constitutional libel case, the central question
is the speaker's knowledge about the meaning of the statement: whether,
in view of potential variances between the speaker's intended statement, the
literal text, and the community interpretation, the speaker's claimed intention about meaning is credible. This inquiry into state of mind-into

9. Bezanson & Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology of Perception in
ContemporaryDefamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REv. 585 (1986) (noting common-law attentiveness
to audience interpretation, and criticizing constitutionalized tort, at least in celebrated Bose
litigation, of neglecting "the capacity of readers to attribute meanings along a continuum and
according to their own expectations and experiences").
10. For an interesting analysis centered on defamatory language as accusatory, and
suggesting a distinction between accusations and reports, see Tiersma, supra note 2.
11. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 842-45 (5th ed. 1984).
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knowledge of the message and awareness of its alleged falsity-predicates
liability almost exclusively on the communicator. 2 If the speaker successfully
claims ignorance of extrinsic meaning either through oversight or stupidity,
there is no liability. The speaker is not liable even for literal falsehood,
much less for foreseeable harm in an extrinsic interpretive setting. The
literal text can absolve the speaker no matter what the speaker's intent if
falsity cannot be proven, but literal falsity or actual harm will not yield
liability unless it was intended by the speaker. In any given case, the
audience and its interpretation are virtually irrelevant, except as an indirect,
occasional check on the credibility of the speaker's claimed meaning.
Given the constitutional tort's focus on falsity and fault, what can be
said about its view of the nature of the communicative process? At least
two perspectives are possible. First, while the constitutional tort may deemphasize the community and its interpretation, the tort remains fully aware
of the interpretive dynamics and wholly shares the common law's expectation
of the cause-and-effect relationship between communication and harm.
Thus, the only difference between the two torts is that the common-law
tort strives to provide a realistic remedy for plaintiffs, while the constitutional tort essentially sacrifices plaintiffs to other priorities.
An alternative view would be that the constitutional tort assumes that
the interpretive dynamic of communication works on another level altogether. The constitutional tort's concern is communication of an "issueregarding" kind; this tort may assume that "public communication" in
general elicits its own sort of interpretation within an issue-regarding community. Since liability is available in far fewer cases than at common law,
the constitutional tort may contemplate a community that is to a certain
extent attuned to the frequent incompleteness, if not exaggeration, of much
public communication-a community accustomed to the "ongoing" quality
of public discussion, and thus habituated to reserving judgment. In this
view the constitutional tort has it own appreciation of the interpretive
dynamic of communication, and is supremely skeptical about any direct
cause-and-effect relationship between public communication and individual
harm. That is, the tort doubts that accusatory public communication actually
injures a plaintiff to any significant degree. Rather, the public perceives
such messages as issue-oriented, and discounts the personal components as
3
hyperbolic or nondefinitive.
12. As the Annenberg Report states: "Libel suits only occasionally resolve the most
critical issue from the plaintiff's perspective-whether the defamatory statement was true or
false. The litigation often focuses on the defendant's alleged malice or recklessness rather than
on the question of truth .... After years of litigation, the court either fails to set the record
straight or does so too late for the decision to be meaningful or useful." Annenberg Report,
supra note 3, at 10. For a study of strategies of proving the communicator's fault, see Bloom,
Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REv. 249 (1985). One by-product
of the fault inquiry is that, in effect, it enables courts to set journalistic standards. See
Cranberg, Libel Judges Are Setting Standardsfor the Press, 42 Washington Journalism Review
(Sept. 1989).
13. The role of hyperbole in the communicative process was an element in Ollman v.
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Thus, the constitutional tort remains ambiguous about its assumptions
concerning the communicative process. Perhaps the tort employs both
approaches described above. Its requirement that "private plaintiffs" prove
falsity and fault (a far greater burden than at common law) may reflect the
first approach-the awareness of cause-and-effect communicative impact
but the sacrifice of plaintiffs to higher values. The tort's even more
burdensome requirements for public officials and public figures may reflect
the second approach-that the community is accustomed to filtering issues
from personalities, that personal harm from accusatory public communication is slight, and that higher values again should prevail.
The declaratory judgment action has its own view of communication.
It is not concerned with a community's interpretation of messages case-bycase, or public communication's dialectic of exaggeration and skepticism.
The declaratory judgment views communication neither as talk nor politics,
but as artifact. It views mass communication in particular as the impersonal
creation of a factual historical record. It seeks to check the communicative
process much as interest groups and other parties seek to check the administrative process.1 4 And the goal of checking the process is to correct the
product through additional publication-to set the record straight about
lives and events whose stories, given modem technology, now become part
of a permanent, retrievable archive. Thus, in the declaratory judgment
action factual error is the gravamen, and meaning is not a function of
audience interpretation of the message or the genre of communication.
Rather, the declaratory judgment tort parses the language, and while it does
so with a view toward reasonable interpretation or meaning, its focus is
not on the audience in any but the most abstract sense. In other words,
the tort does not rest on the dynamics of perception, interpretation, and
meaning in the context of a particular community with particular values.
Nor does it appear to rest on any assumption that individual harm is
predictably caused by communication, as the individual's harm does not
seem to be the principal wrong to be remedied.
Falsity, not harm to an individual's reputation, lies at the heart of the
declaratory judgment tort. Indeed, the declaratory judgment action abjures
any assumption that communication is a personal, complex, and dynamic
phenomenon with significance only in a particular environment. Differences
in the process of communication and the meaning and weight of a statement
that exist in such varied settings as political campaigns, public discussion
of private morals, or cocktail party slanders are given scant attention.

Evans and Novak, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Starr, J. for the majority; Bork,
J., concurring), dealing with fact/opinion doctrine, but it deserves study as a key underlying
aspect of much communicative tort law.
14. In a sense, this is a twist on Justice Stewart's statement that "(t)he primary purpose
of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth institution outside
the government as an additional check on the three official branches." Stewart, "Or of the
Press," 26 HASTiNGS L. J. 631, 634 (1975). The declaratory judgment action becomes a vehicle
to check the checking institution of the press.
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Instead, it is the words used, with meaning ascribed in the abstract, that is
important. In contrast to the common-law tort, where what was heard is
important, and the constitutional tort, where what was intended is determinative, the declaratory judgment tort focuses on what was said.
The nature of communication thus prompts a variety of descriptive
models. Each is subject to question. Is communication as direct a cause of
harm as the common law would have it? Is "public" communication as
nuanced and indirect as the constitutional tort seems to say? And in the
bureaucratic vision of the declaratory judgment action, are words and
phrases as conducive to parsing for "truth" as the tort would hope?
III.
The differences in assumption about the nature of the communicative
process reflect and perhaps cause related differences in the value each tort
gives to communication in a social setting. It is here that important differences in the purposes of the torts begin to emerge.
The common-law tort with its focus on extrinsic community interpretation is communitarian in nature. It protects the individual's identity in
society, and therefore safeguards against the individual's unwarranted exclusion from his or her social arrangements at whatever level. The heart of
the tort is disparagement in the context of existing family, social, and
community relations, not falsity. Indeed, this is the significance of the adage
that at common law, the greater the truth, the greater the libel. While truth
can absolve the speaker at common law, truth is the speaker's burden, and
truth functions fundamentally as a justification for a statement being made,
not as a negation of libel. At common law, therefore, the tort protected
the individual, regardless of station in society, in his or her capacity to
function in organized social arrangements.
The constitutional tort neither protects the individual nor stabilizes the
individual's ability to function in the full range of communities. Instead,
the constitutional tort focuses virtually all of its attention on the social
value of communication by protecting the speaker no matter what the price
exacted in the individual's relationships, and it reflects broader societal
characteristics by protecting virtually all expression of a public nature
notwithstanding falsity and without serious regard to the harm inflicted. In
this respect the constitutional tort is a manifestation of the often brutal,
false, and calculatedly self-serving quality of our system of political and
public dialogue. The speaker's intention and motive are determinative in
order that the speaker be in full, unilateral control of liability. The level
of tolerance afforded expression is extreme, reflecting society's deep-seated
commitment to communication as a valued instrument of freedom and selfgovernment, notwithstanding the costs individuals must bear in service to
that end. The individual's interest in nonexclusion from his or her specific
relationships is subordinated to the individual's duty to the larger social
relationships fostered by open and uninhibited expression.
The declaratory judgment tort does not, at least in purpose, foster
either the individual's personal relationships in the community or the general
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social value of uninhibited expression on public matters, although it protects
both values to a meaningful extent by negating the extremes of each of the
other torts. The declaratory judgment tort does, however, serve a distinct
and affirmative purpose. It exacts accountability to truth on the communicator, and it does so particularly for the press. The press is an institution
whose function is central to political freedom, but it is also an institution
with largely unchecked power. 15 Legal liability premised only on the press'
intention as a speaker affords too great a freedom, particularly in a political
culture that values truth and views free expression as a means to truth, not
as an end in itself. Therefore, the "check" of truth on the press' power
not only strikes a sensible chord, but it also advances another more
fundamental social value-truth in information upon which people act. The
check of truth also affords a measure of protection to the harmed individual-not complete protection to be sure, but at least the prospect that
the most serious injuries to public persona can be corrected by truth rather
than money.
IV.
It will not come as a surprise that the "sociological" characteristics of
the three libel torts reflect in large part the differences in the torts'
assumptions about communication and the distinct social purposes each tort
serves. Under the heading of "sociological" characteristics we include the
types of parties for whom relief is accessible, the types of harm remedied,
and the relief available as well as its likelihood.
The common-law tort is oriented toward the individual and the remedying of personal harm through damages. The elements of required proofpublication, disparagement of reputation in a community, and resulting
harm-are relatively straightforward, and are far from difficult to establish.
Consequently, the likelihood of success in litigation is substantial, particu16
larly in relation to the other torts.
The common-law tort is as "classless" as any of the torts. While
persons who are likely to initiate suit will tend to come from the more
wealthy and prominent segments of society, as is the case with any form
of litigation, common-law doctrine poses no obstacles to members of any
segment of society, as the definition of reputational community is broad

15. Perhaps this was one reason that Judge Sofaer's use of special verdicts in the case
of Sharon v. Time was so widely-noted. Jurors separately announced verdicts on falsity,
defamation, and actual malice. See R. SMoi.A, SUING TaE P.Ess 91-92 (1986). General Sharon's
attorney said, "It provide[d] the opportunity for a plaintiff who proves falsity to be vindicated."
Richard M. Goldstein, quoted in Kaplan, The Judge's Postmortem of the Sharon Libel Trial,
Nat. L. J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 1, 27.
16. Professor Epstein points out that "the general tendency in defamation cases has
always been for a powerful rule of strict liability" given that "the (d)efamation is made to
third persons about the plaintiff, so that prima facie the plaintiff is in no way responsible for
the commission of the wrong and typically could do very little, if anything, to protect himself."
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 Cm. L. R~v. 782, 797 (1986).
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and flexible. Moreover, the significant doctrinal advantages given plaintiffs
at common law, such as the requirement of showing disparagement and
harm but not falsity or fault, makes the likelihood of success greater, and
therefore makes the legal system more accessible through contingency fee
arrangements. Because the likelihood of success falls along the normal
distribution experienced generally in civil litigation, negotiation and settlement are encouraged, with money being the principal medium of compromise. The statements subject to litigation tend to span a broad range of
personal and public interests.
The greatest risk for the press that the common-law tort poses is
experienced by large publishers due to the relatively high risk of liability,
the difficulty of predicting harm, and the open-ended damage rules. On a
comparative basis, at least, the risk is also greatest for the "legitimate"
press whose care in publication will be less effective in preventing harm
inasmuch as the interests of individuals in their relationships is often
unknown, and because good faith belief in truth is not a defense.
While the common-law tort most advantages lower and middle class
plaintiffs and most threatens the legitimate and large publishers, the constitutional tort does almost precisely the opposite. Because of the difficulty
of overcoming the fault privileges in the constitutional tort, the required
proof of falsity, and the resultantly high risk of loss even in the most
egregious case, the legal system is effectively foreclosed to all plaintiffs
7
except those with very substantial wealth or very considerable power.'
Contingency arrangements are not easily available to those who cannot
afford a lawyer, and even those cases first brought on contingency tend to
wither away once the obstacles become clear. Only the powerful plaintiffs,
the representation of whom is itself valuable to an attorney, can exact
contingency arrangements.
The constitutional tort thus remains most available to the wealthy and
powerful. They can afford to engage an attorney. While success or the
obtaining of damages is unlikely, damages are very high if the plaintiff
succeeds. Perhaps as important, the wealthy and powerful plaintiff achieves
vindication and punishment of the press by the press' coverage of the suit,
regardless of the outcome. And ultimate loss on the merits of the suit-on
the accuracy of the offending statement-is rare, as the fault privileges
typically resolve the case in advance of such a determination. Even more
typically, once filed and once publicized, the suit is dropped or left dormant.
Because of the probability that the defendant will completely defeat the
action due to the fault privileges, and because the plaintiffs' motives tend
not to be financial, settlement is rare and is effectively discouraged.
In addition, the risks that the constitutional tort imposes tend to be
exactly the opposite of those presented at common law. Those placed at

17. For information on the composition of plaintiffs in libel cases, costs of litigation,
and related fee arrangements in media libel cases, and the outcomes reached in media and
nonmedia cases, see LmEL LAW AND Tn PRESS, supra note 5, at 69-72, 118-44, 146-51.
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greatest risk-of loss and of the very large damage awards a showing of
negligence or malice brings-are small publishers" for whom the cost of
the discovery process can be prohibitive and thorough investigation conforming to the best professional norms may be difficult, and the most
scurrilous publishers whose business is based on rumor and falsehood. The
irresponsible press is also placed at risk by the common-law tort; it is simply
the subject of more focused risk in the constitutional action, as the elements
of proof relating to purposeful falsehood and shoddy procedures are a
central part of the inquiry in a constitutional libel case.
It is perhaps ironic, although surely not surprising, that the cost of
broader protection for individual reputation at common law is greater
exposure of the legitimate press to liability, and that the cost of protecting
the legitimate press in the constitutional action is the effective legal disenfranchisement of lower and middle income plaintiffs. This irony, perhaps
more than any other factor, accounts for Justice Powell's sensible insight
that the better answer might lie in damage limitations rather than in the
creation of complex substantive privileges. 19 This same insight is the premise
upon which the declaratory judgment action was crafted: no privileges, no
damages. But upon reflection it is far from clear that the compromise
struck in that particular form of libel tort would have the intended effect.
In many respects the declaratory judgment action offers the worst of both
worlds from a "sociological" point of view.
The declaratory judgment action requires proof of falsity by the plaintiff, and relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving fault, but affords
no damages. For many plaintiffs-particularly for the wealthy and powerful
with legitimate claims-this strikes an advantageous balance. But for the
lower and middle income plaintiffs who bore the principal burden of the
constitutional tort, this provides precious little. It is the lower and middle
income plaintiffs whose injury is most likely to be economic. More importantly, without the prospect of money damages, lower and middle income
plaintiffs will not be able to afford a lawyer, and therefore will still be
effectively foreclosed from the legal system for vindication of their claim.
In addition, because falsity, not reputational harm in the community, is the

18. For an account of a case in which a "modestly profitable, family-owned and operated
newspaper that had been in the community for almost a century and a half" went bankrupt
following libel litigation, see T. LTrrLEWOOD, COALs OF FiRE, THE ALTON TELEGRAPH LBEL
CASE XV (1988). Information on the type, size, and circulation of media defendants is provided
in LIBEL LAW AND Tm PREss, supra note 5, at 19-21, 271 n.7, 283-84 n.76. Not surprisingly,
most media defendants are local newspapers with modest circulation (15,000 to 50,000).

19. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Powell wrote:
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. * * * The largely

uncontrolled discretion of juries ... unnecessarily compounds the potential of any
system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First
Amendment freedoms . . ., invit[ing] juries to punish unpopular opinion ....
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focus of the declaratory judgment case, the tort is likely to be overprotective
for the wealthy and powerful plaintiffs who retain access to the legal system,
for they will be able to remedy falsehood even when it has resulted in no
material, personal reputational harm. The harm, instead, is the publication
of false fact.
For the press the balance of advantage and disadvantage is complex in
the declaratory judgment tort. The legitimate press could be exposed to
broad liability for error; indeed, in theory it could be exposed to such
liability more broadly than is the case with either the common-law or
constitutional torts, as error, not reputational harm, is at issue. Yet the
extent of exposure will be greatly reduced. Intrusive inquiry into the publication and editorial process will be largely eliminated, and money damages
will no longer be possible. Defense costs as well will likely be reduced.
Particularly in view of the fact that suits by low and middle income plaintiffs
will likely be economically foreclosed by the absence of money damages,
the legitimate press-large and small-will on balance benefit from the
declaratory judgment tort.
The more irresponsible segments of the press, however, will benefit
much more. These publishers also will gain from the reduction in access to
the legal system by low and middle income plaintiffs, and they will benefit
very substantially from the elimination of damages. For these publishers,
both the common-law and constitutional libel torts posed a significant
economic threat, for even under the constitutional regime, proof of reckless
indifference to truth could result in massive punitive awards. The elimination
of this economic threat would free irresponsible publishers from a potentially
decisive factor in the publication decision.
On a more general level, the declaratory judgment remedy poses a
broader risk to the press. This peril is the risk of liability across a broad
range for factual error-a risk never experienced by the press in the past.
While the remedy for error is no more than correction, something the press
professes to do in any event when error is discovered, the instrument of
enforcement under the declaratory judgment action would become the
courts, not the press itself. The declaratory judgment action, in short, exacts
broad-based accountability on the press. While the action is perhaps an
understandable antidote to the press' ineffective self-regulation,20 this fact
discloses the principal characteristic of the declaratory judgment libel tort.
Whether intended or de facto, the declaratory judgment action exacts press
accountability. The standard of accountability is truth. Its effective operation
is in the sphere of public debate and discussion of public people. Its impact,
if not its goal, would be the counteracting of falsity with truth, although
only when the wealthy or powerful have a stake in the cleansing process,
and only when the judicial process is able to untangle truth from falsehood. 2'

20. See Project, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and Their
Legal Implications, 72 IowA L. REv. 637 (1987).
21. Some commentators argue that courts should not be arbiters of truth. See J. Kirtley,
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THREE VOICES OF LIBEL

V.
The three libel torts speak in radically different voices. The commonlaw tort speaks to the private interest in reputation and stability within the
community. It is broadly accessible, although imperfect in many respects.
It reflects a more local, even pastoral set of interests, protecting the
individual against unwarranted exclusion from society; it seems premised
on a communitarian, local culture, and a tenor of public debate that
acknowledges high standards of care and gentility; it makes the press the
handmaiden of the individual.
The voice of the constitutional tort reflects a less appealing but perhaps
more real culture marked by mendacity. The cultural values underlying the
constitutional tort are impersonal, national, and highly individualistic. Individual freedom of expression is the highest value, even if the "individual"
is a powerful organization; other values of community and reason are
subordinate. Wide-open, uninhibited debate, even on factual matters, is the
preferred norm. Falsity has value in such a system, even when it does great
harm to the individual. Expression, particularly by the organized press, is
instrumental as a check on power. The freedom accorded expression,
therefore, must reflect the culture in which expression operates as an
antidote. If the culture is perceived as mendacious-as marked by selfinterest and deception-so also must its antidote be free to pursue selfinterest and deception. For the constitutional tort, political speech is most
valued, controversy is most encouraged, and the calculated lie is the principal
object of legal redress. For most other harms occasioned by libel, the legal
system plays no effective role. The voice of the legal system reflects the
essential character of the culture, and in an individualistic, national, mendacious culture the force of law is limited to what is most central.
The voice of the declaratory judgment libel tort is accountability of the
press, although the declaratory judgment action also reflects a view of
society much like that of the constitutional tort. Through its limited remedies, its focus on false fact rather than on reputation, and its absence of
money damages, the declaratory judgment action is effectively limited in its
operation to the field of public expression concerning public-wealthy and
powerful-people. Its functioning thus essentially reflects the individualistic,
national, and impersonal view of our culture. But in this setting, at least,
the declaratory judgment tort reflects a discomfort with the ends equals

Proposalto Reform Libel Law Has Troubling Aspects, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 5, 1988, at
52. But Justice White states that "the logical consequence" of such a view "is that the First
Amendment forbids all libel and slander suits, for in each suit, there will be no recovery unless
the court finds the publication at issue to be factually false. Of course no forum is perfect,
but that is not a justification for leaving whole classes of defamed individuals without redress
.... " Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 768 n.2 (White, J.,
concurring) (1985).
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means mentality of the constitutional tort-a discomfort with the proposition
that mendaciousness justifies mendaciousness, that the perceived prevalence
of self-serving deceptiveness in the political system warrants legal protection
for it in the system of free expression. In its place, the declaratory judgment
tort permits a relatively unthreatening antidote of truth, in the hope, it
seems, that through truth some semblance of other important values in
public discourse can be retained. Whether this goal can be accomplished
without changing the underlying culture-indeed while leaving it in place
and giving it even more breathing room-cannot be known. It can be
doubted to be sure, but the declaratory judgment libel tort has yet to be
given a chance to dispel the skepticism.
What can be said, however, is that in significant respects the libel tort
is, as it has always been throughout its history, a voice of the culture in
which it operates. Over its long history it has been transformed from a
means of suppressing dissent and consolidating power to a means, reflected
in its current constitutional form, of fostering dissent, encouraging uninhibited debate, and debasing political power. Just as surely as in the past, the
libel tort will continue in the future to reflect our culture-both its current
condition and our collective aspirations for its future.
In the three libel torts, we hear three radically different cultures. One
is local, communitarian, and individual or personal. One is national, individualistic, and impersonal. One exacts accountability-not to the individual
but to a more abstracted idea of truth. One is congenial, one is mendacious,
and one is idealistic. Our purpose is not to identify the best alternative.
While we may have preferences, the important point is that the three torts
are not better or worse than the other. They are different. The proper
choice is the voice with which we want to speak, and that choice, if we are
correct, belongs to us all, not as a product of democratic process or analytic
distillation, but as a reflection of our culture.

